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Abstract 
Using aggregate analysis, this paper examines the core contentions of the “varieties of 
capitalism” perspective on comparative capitalism. We construct a coordination index 
to assess whether the institutional features of liberal and coordinated market econo-
mies conform to the predictions of the theory. We test the contention that institu-
tional complementarities occur across sub-spheres of the macroeconomy by examin-
ing the correspondence of institutions across sub-spheres and estimating the impact 
of complementarities in labor relations and corporate governance on rates of growth. 
To assess the stability of the institutional features central to the theory, we assess the 
dynamics of institutional change in recent years. The evidence suggests that there are 
powerful interaction effects among institutions across sub-spheres of the political 
economy that must be considered if the economic impact of institutional change in 
any one sphere is to be accurately assessed. 
 
Zusammenfassung 
Mit Hilfe von Aggregatdaten analysiert dieses Papier Kernaussagen des „Varieties-of-
Capitalism“-Ansatzes. Um beurteilen zu können, ob die Aussagen der Theorie mit den 
institutionellen Begebenheiten liberaler und koordinierter Ökonomien übereinstim-
men, konstruieren wir einen ländervergleichenden Index der ökonomischen Koordi-
nation. Wir überprüfen die These von der institutionellen Komplementarität zwi-
schen den verschiedenen Sphären politischer Ökonomien, indem wir das Zusammen-
wirken von Institutionen analysieren und den Einfluss komplementärer Institutionen 
der Arbeitsbeziehungen und der Unternehmenskontrolle auf die Höhe von Wachs-
tumsraten untersuchen. Wir diskutieren darüber hinaus, wie stabil die institutionellen 
Begebenheiten in den vergangenen Jahren waren. Im Ergebnis zeigen sich starke In-
teraktionseffekte zwischen den Sphären politischer Ökonomien, die berücksichtigt 
werden müssen, um die wirtschaftlichen Wirkungen institutionellen Wandels in ein-
zelnen Sphären zu verstehen. 
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How do national variations in the institutions of the political economy affect eco-
nomic performance? This question has been central to comparative political economy 
for many years. However, most answers to it focus on institutions in a single sphere of 
the political economy. In economics, there are large but separate literatures on labor 
and financial markets. One explores the impact of labor regulations, social regimes, 
and trade unions on growth or unemployment (Nickell 1997; OECD 1994; Calmfors/
Driffil 1988). The other considers the effects of accounting standards, the legal stand-
ing of owners or creditors, ownership patterns, and equity or bank-based finance on 
levels of investment or growth (Carlin/Mayer 1999a, 1999b; LaPorta et al. 1998a; 
Huang/Xu 1999; Mayer 1996). A similar separation is evident in political science. 
Although neocorporatism can be defined in broad terms (cf. Katzenstein 1985; 
Schmitter/Lehmbruch 1978), analyses of its economic impact usually focus on the 
organization of the trade union movement, considering its interaction mainly with 
the partisanship of governance (Cameron 1984; Alvarez et al. 1991; Garrett 1999).1 An 
entirely different literature examines the structure of financial systems (Verdier 2000; 
Cox 1986; Zysman 1984).2 
However, there are good reasons to expect interaction effects among institutions 
across spheres of the political economy. In recent years, significant interaction effects 
have been found between monetary institutions and those governing wage coordina-
tion (Franzese 2002; Cukierman/Lippi 1999; Soskice/Iversen 2000; Iversen et al. 2000; 
Iversen 1998; Hall/Franzese 1998). But investigation of such effects among other in-
stitutions has barely begun (cf. Amable 2000; Amable et al. 2001; Ernst 2002; Fehn/
Meier 2000; Caballero/Hamour 1998; Nicoletti et al. 2000). 
The problem can be described as one of identifying institutional complementarities in 
the macroeconomy. Economists have identified complementarities among the activi-
ties of firms: marketing strategies based on product customization, for instance, can 
be complementary to computer-controlled machines on the production line (cf. Jai-
                                                        
We are grateful to Alexander Kuo for research assistance and to the John D. and Catherine T. 
MacArthur Foundation for a grant to Hall for research and writing. For helpful comments, we 
thank James Alt, Bruno Amable, Moreno Bertoldi, Robert Boyer, Colin Crouch, Eckhard Ernst, 
Peter Gourevitch, Torben Iversen, Bruce Kogut, Martin Höpner, Marino Regini, and Wolfgang 
Streeck. An earlier version of this paper was presented to the American Political Science Associa-
tion, August 2001. A shorter version has been published in German: Peter A. Hall and Daniel W. 
Gingerich, “Spielarten des Kapitalismus” und institutionelle Komplementaritäten in der Makro-
ökonomie – Eine empirische Analyse, in: Berliner Journal für Soziologie 14, 2004, 5–32.  
1 Hicks and Kenworthy (1998; cf. Kenworthy 1995) are a notable exception. They examine the 
impact of neocorporatism construed as a broad system of cooperation; and a few other studies 
do so as well, without, however, examining interaction effects among spheres of the economy 
directly. 
2 Less relevant to this paper but of equal importance is a literature on the economic impact of 
variation in the institutions responsible for economic policy (cf. Drazen 2000; Persson/Ta-
belini 1994). 
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kumar 1986; Milgrom/Roberts 1990, 1995). It is plausible to posit analogous com-
plementarities among the institutions structuring relations in the political economy 
(Amable 2000). One set of institutions is complementary to another when its presence 
raises the returns available from the other. Here, we refer to the returns to the actors 
involved in the relevant activities that feed into national economic performance.3 
The requirement for any investigation of this issue, however, is a theory specifying 
why two or more institutions might be complementary to each other, and where such 
complementarities are located in the political economy. Aoki (1994) offers important 
observations about the issue but focuses only on the case of Japan. An important lit-
erature on comparative capitalism suggests that political economies contain such 
complementarities (Crouch/Streeck 1997; Whitley 1999; Hollingsworth/Boyer 1997; 
Albert 1993), but most contributions to it address a limited number of countries and 
do not specify the complementarities in readily generalizable terms.4 
In this context, a new body of work on ‘varieties of capitalism’ is important (cf. Hall/
Soskice 2001b).5 Its formulations contain a theory about the nature of the institu-
tional complementarities found in the political economies of the developed world. 
Applying the new economics of organization to the macroeconomy, this literature 
distinguishes among capitalist economies by reference to the means firms and other 
actors use to coordinate their endeavors. It suggests that nations cluster into identifi-
able groups based on the extent to which firms rely on market or strategic modes of 
coordination and that important complementarities can exist between the institutions 
in different spheres of the political economy. From this follow many important con-
tentions about variations in economic performance, comparative institutional advan-
tage, national responses to globalization, and comparative public policy, which are 
grounded in a rich set of comparative case studies (see the references in Hall/Soskice 
2001b).6 
However, the core postulates of the varieties of capitalism approach have not yet been 
subjected to empirical tests based on aggregate analysis of a large number of cases. As 
yet, we do not even have good measures for the character of coordination, the concept 
                                                        
3 Obviously, this leaves aside the question of how these returns are distributed, a matter that 
may also be conditioned by the character of the institutions. 
4 For important recent exceptions, see Amable (2000); Amable et al. (2001); Ernst (2002); Boyer 
(1989). 
5 This approach originates in early formulations by Soskice (1990a, 1990b) that build on the 
literature about neocorporatism and regulation (cf. Katzenstein 1985; Boyer 1989) but add to 
it a fuller appreciation for the role that employer networks play in the economy. It has subse-
quently been developed by Soskice and a number of other scholars, many of whom are con-
tributors to Hall and Soskice (2001b). 
6 Aggregate analysis has been applied to a few of the relatively specific propositions generated 
by this approach (cf. Franzese 2001; Estevez et al. 2001; Iversen/Soskice 2000, 2001). 
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at the heart of the analysis. This poses many problems. Case studies have been used to 
classify nations into general categories, but reliance on such broad classifications has 
meant that a theory designed to offer insights about all the developed nations is some-
times misinterpreted to be one that speaks only to a few ideal types, and the position 
of many nations within these categories remains ambiguous. 
The object of this paper is to address these problems, by devising indicators for some 
of the central concepts of the varieties of capitalism approach and subjecting some of 
its core contentions to aggregate empirical tests. We begin by developing indices to 
measure the character of coordination in key spheres of the political economy. We use 
them and other measures to assess the plausibility of the account given by the varieties 
of capitalism perspective about how behavior across the sub-spheres of the political 
economy interlocks and how national political economies differ. We then examine the 
core postulates of the theory about the presence of institutional complementarities in 
the macroeconomy. Finally, we examine patterns of political adjustment and institu-
tional change in order to assess the durability of the national distinctions identified by 
this approach. Before considering specific propositions, we open with an overview of 
the varieties of capitalism perspective.7 
1 The varieties of capitalism approach 
In contrast to the large literature focused on national labor movements, varieties of 
capitalism analyses assume that firms are the central actors in the economy whose 
behavior aggregates into national economic performance. In order to prosper, firms 
must engage with others in multiple spheres of the political economy: to raise finance 
(on financial markets), to regulate wages and working conditions (industrial rela-
tions), to ensure workers have the requisite skills (education and training), to secure 
access to inputs and technology (via interfirm relations), to compete for customers (in 
product markets), and to secure the cooperation of their workforce (firm–employee 
relations). Adopting a relational view of the firm, this perspective assumes that the key 
to success in each of these endeavors is efficient coordination with other actors. The 
central problems facing firms are, therefore, coordination problems involving other 
actors in the economy. 
The varieties of capitalism approach draws a distinction between two modes of coor-
dination. In one, firms coordinate with other actors primarily through competitive 
markets, characterized by arms-length relations and formal contracting. Here, equi-
                                                        
7 This approach originates in the early work of David Soskice (1990a, b), and the account given 
of it here draws extensively on joint work with him (Hall/Soskice 2001a). 
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librium outcomes are dictated primarily by relative prices, market signals, and famil-
iar marginalist considerations. In the other modality, firms coordinate with other 
actors through processes of strategic interaction of the kind typically modeled by 
game theory. Here, equilibrium outcomes depend on the institutional support avail-
able for the formation of credible commitments, including support for effective in-
formation-sharing, monitoring, sanctioning, and deliberation.8 
Although instances of market and strategic coordination occur in all capitalist 
economies, this approach contends that, in the spheres central to firm endeavor, the 
balance between these two types of coordination varies across political economies. At 
one end of the spectrum stand liberal market economies (LMEs) where relations be-
tween firms and other actors are coordinated primarily by competitive markets. At the 
other end are coordinated market economies (CMEs) where firms typically engage in 
more strategic interaction with trade unions, suppliers of finance, and other actors.9 
Whether a firm coordinates its endeavors through market relations or strategic inter-
action is said to depend on the institutional setting. Where markets are imperfect and 
there is substantial institutional support for the formation of credible commitments, 
firms can be expected to rely more extensively on strategic coordination. Where mar-
kets are fluid and there is little support for such commitments, firms will rely more 
heavily on market coordination. Accordingly there should be a correspondence be-
tween the institutional configuration of each sphere of the economy and the character 
of coordination there.10 
The distinction will be clearer if we describe a liberal and coordinated market econ-
omy. Market coordination is a familiar concept in neoclassical economics, and the 
United States is a typical liberal market economy. Here, firms face large equity mar-
kets marked by high levels of transparency and dispersed shareholding, where firms’ 
access to external finance depends heavily on publicly assessable criteria such as mar-
ket valuation. Regulatory regimes allow hostile takeovers that depend on share price, 
rendering managers sensitive to current profitability. Because trade unions are rela-
                                                        
8 This list of the institutional correlates of effective strategic coordination is a familiar one that 
draws on the conventional literature (cf. Ostrom 1990) but also includes the presence of a ca-
pacity for deliberation whose importance is outlined in Hall /Soskice (2001a). 
9 The approach concentrates on cross-national variation because it examines spheres were na-
tional regulations and nationally specific institutions are especially important, but it acknowl-
edges there can be additional variation across specific regions or sectors (cf. Campbell et al. 
1991; Herrigel 1996). 
10 Of course, the distinction between institutions and coordination is a narrow one, especially if 
coordination is construed as rule-patterned behavior (cf. Calvert 1995). Here, institutions are 
construed as rules and practices, more or less formal, that actors take into account when mak-
ing decisions about what actions to undertake. These include the institutions generated by the 
organizational setting (cf. Hall /Soskice 2001a: 9).  
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tively weak and employment protection low, labor markets are fluid and wage-setting 
primarily a matter of contract between workers and individual employers. Because 
labor markets are fluid, workers have incentives to invest in general skills that can be 
taken to other jobs, and, because industry associations are weak, firms lack the capac-
ity to mount the collaborative training programs that confer industry-specific skills. 
Technology transfer is accomplished primarily by licensing or taking on expert per-
sonnel, and standards are usually set by market races. Top managers enjoy substantial 
authority over all aspects of firm strategy, including layoffs. In such settings, many of 
the relationships firms form with other actors are mediated by competitive markets. 
Although there are variations among them, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Canada, 
Australia and New Zealand are also generally identified by this approach as liberal 
market economies. 
Germany provides a good example of a coordinated market economy. Its firms are 
closely connected by dense networks of cross-shareholding and membership in influ-
ential employers associations. These networks provide for substantial exchanges of 
private information, allowing firms to develop reputations that permit them some 
access to capital on terms that depend more heavily on reputation than share value. 
Accordingly, managers are less sensitive to current profitability. In the presence of 
strong trade unions, powerful works councils, and high levels of employment protec-
tion, labor markets are less fluid and job tenures longer. In most industries, wage-
setting is coordinated by trade unions and employers associations that also supervise 
collaborative training schemes, providing workers with industry-specific skills and 
assurances of available positions if they invest in them. Industry associations play a 
major role in standard-setting with legal endorsement, and substantial amounts of 
technology transfer take place through interfirm collaboration. Hemmed in by power-
ful workforce representatives and business networks, top managers have less scope for 
unilateral action, and firms typically adhere to more consensual styles of decision-
making. 
It should be apparent that, in order to perform their core functions, firms in coordi-
nated market economies like that of Germany must engage in strategic interaction in 
multiple spheres, although the institutions on which they rely and the quality of the 
outcomes may vary from one to another. Austria, Japan, South Korea, Sweden, Nor-
way, Finland, Denmark, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Switzerland are usually also 
identified by those who adopt this approach as coordinated market economies. 
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2 Establishing coordination as a crucial dimension 
We begin our analysis by examining the core contention of the varieties of capitalism 
approach that the developed economies differ systematically from one another ac-
cording to the extent to which firms depend on market or strategic coordination to 
accomplish their endeavors. Of course, the character of coordination is difficult to 
measure directly. However, as Hall and Soskice (2001a) point out, the nature of the 
coordination present in any sphere of the economy depends on the type of institu-
tions available to support it there. Accordingly, a factor analysis designed to identify 
commonalities that may be unobservable in themselves but that correlate with a range 
of observable variables provides an appropriate technique for identifying the character 
of coordination (Harman 1976). By performing a factor analysis on a set of institu-
tional measures that are commonly associated with one type of coordination or an-
other, we can assess whether the dimensions of market and strategic coordination 
posited by varieties of capitalism theory exist and where they are present. Varieties of 
capitalism theory generates two hypotheses that can be tested using such an analysis: 
H1: The character of coordination constitutes a key dimension stretching across spheres of 
the political economy. 
If this is correct, a factor analysis of variables representing the institutional conditions 
associated with different types of coordination in various spheres of the political 
economy should identify a single principal component loading on the relevant vari-
ables across spheres of the political economy. 
H2: This dimension reflects variation along a spectrum running from market coordina-
tion to strategic coordination. 
If this is correct, the underlying factor identified in the analysis should be positively 
correlated with indicators for institutional support for strategic coordination and 
negatively correlated with indicators for institutional support for market coordina-
tion. 
The central obstacle to such an analysis is the paucity of relevant indicators available 
for more than a few countries. The measurement of coordination poses special diffi-
culties. In principle, types of coordination are observable, but intense observation is 
required. Only one sphere has been the object of such observation, namely that of 
wage bargaining. Accordingly, we employ two independent assessments of coordina-
tion in wage bargaining. The other variables used in the factor analysis are all indica-
tors of institutional features of the political economy that can reasonably be said to 
provide support for or to reflect the operation of one type of coordination or the 
other. We have deliberately identified variables that extend across two important 
spheres of the political economy, those pertinent to labor relations and corporate gov-
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ernance. The observations were drawn from the 1990–1995 period, the latest for 
which comparable data is available. 
The variables employed in the factor analysis are as follows:11 
Shareholder Power reflects the legal protection and likely influence over firms of ordinary 
shareholders relative to managers or dominant shareholders. It is a composite measure of legal 
regulations covering six issues: the availability of proxy voting, deposit requirements for 
shares, the election of directors, the legal recourse available to minority shareholders, share-
holders’ rights to issues of new stock, and the calling of shareholder meetings. Regulations 
governing each issue are coded 0 or 1 and summed. Higher scores indicate that ordinary 
shareholders enjoy more rights vis-à-vis managers and dominant shareholders (La Porta et al. 
1998a: 1130). 
Dispersion of Control indicates how many firms in the economy are widely held relative to 
the number with controlling shareholders. Taking the smallest ten firms with market capitali-
zation of common equity of at least $500 million at the end of 1995 as a sample of firms, it 
reports the percentage that do not have a controlling shareholder, defined as one who con-
trols, directly or indirectly, more than 10 percent of the voting rights in the firm. Higher val-
ues indicate that larger proportions of firms in the economy are widely held (LaPorta et al. 
1998b: Table II, Panel B). 
Size of Stock Market is the market valuation of equities on the stock exchanges of a nation as 
a percentage of its gross domestic product in 1993 (Oecd.org /corporate affairs). 
Level of Wage Coordination is the level at which unions normally coordinate wage-claims 
and employers coordinate wage-offers where 3 represents the national level, 2 the intermediate 
level, and 1 the firm level. Levels of coordination for unions and employers are assessed sepa-
rately and averaged. Higher values indicate higher levels of coordination in wage-setting 
(Layard/Nickell/ Jackson 1991: 52). 
Degree of Wage Coordination reflects estimates by the OECD Secretariat of the degree to 
which wage bargaining is (strategically) coordinated by unions and employers along a scale on 
which 3 indicates coordinated and 1 indicates uncoordinated. Observations are for 1994. 
Higher values indicate higher levels of wage coordination (OECD 1997: 71). 
Labor Turnover is an indicator of the fluidity of national labor markets and reports the num-
ber of employees who had held their jobs for less than one year as a percentage of all employ-
ees surveyed in 1995
12
 (OECD 1997: 138). 
The appropriateness of these variables for the analysis should be apparent from our 
description of liberal and coordinated market economies. The first three variables 
                                                        
11 Further details of the derivation and definition of these measures can be found in the original 
sources. 
12 The value for New Zealand on this variable is estimated using a multiple imputation tech-
nique. 
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reflect institutional variation in the sphere of corporate governance of the sort high-
lighted by the varieties of capitalism approach. Where the balance of influence tilts 
toward dominant shareholders, ownership is relatively concentrated, and equity mar-
kets are small, securing access to external finance and negotiating corporate control is 
more likely to involve firms in strategic interaction within corporate networks. When 
these conditions are reversed, issues of finance and corporate control are determined 
more heavily by more competitive markets. The next three variables reflect relevant 
variation in the sphere of labor relations. Two assess the level and degree of strategic 
coordination in wage bargaining. Labor turnover reflects the degree to which workers 
move from one firm to another via competitive labor markets. 
 
Table 1 Factor loadings of the coordination index 
 Coordination Uniqueness 
Shareholder power .705 .503 
Dispersion of control .821 .325 
Size of stock market .638 .593 
Level of wage coordination 
−.721 .481 
Labor turnover .512 .739 
Degree of wage coordination 
−.874 .235 
Eigenvalue 3.12  
Note: Estimates calculated by principle factors method; factor presented above was the only one whose 
eigenvalue exceeded 1. 
Since the number of indicators available for such an analysis is limited if one wants to 
include a large number of nations as we do, and the likelihood of some measurement 
error is high, we entered the analysis with low expectations. Given these constraints, 
the results are highly supportive of the terms the varieties of capitalism literature uses 
to characterize political economies. We performed a factor analysis on these variables 
using the principal factors method, and Table 1 reports the results. The analysis iden-
tifies an underlying factor along which the nations vary with an eigenvalue of 3.12, 
and only one such factor with an eigenvalue above 1. All variables in the analysis are 
highly correlated with this factor and their signs are congruent with the expectations 
one would have for a factor representing the extent of market coordination relative to 
strategic coordination in the political economy. These results suggest that the first two 
hypotheses examined here should be accepted, and they tend to confirm the basic 
contention of the varieties of capitalism literature that economies vary systematically 
according to the relative balance of strategic and market coordination in their political 
economies. 
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3 Locating political economies relative to one another 
As we have noted, the varieties of capitalism approach classifies some nations as lib-
eral market economies and others as coordinated market economies, although it also 
anticipates variation within each category and nations that may lie beyond them (Hall/
Soskice 2001a). To assess whether this approach classifies countries correctly and 
whether the basis for the classification is well-grounded, we test two further hypotheses. 
H3: It is possible to identify a distinctive set of liberal market economies that make exten-
sive use of market coordination and another set of coordinated market economies that 
make extensive use of strategic coordination. 
If this is correct, when the factor loadings are used to construct scores for each nation, 
the nations identified by the theory as liberal market economies should be located 
toward the ‘market’ end of the dimension, and those identified as coordinated market 
economies should be located closer to the ‘strategic’ end. 
To assess this hypothesis, we constructed an index based on the factor analysis de-
scribed in the previous section and calculated scores on it for each of the OECD na-
tions for which we have data. This can be construed as a ‘coordination index’ assess-
ing the overall balance of strategic coordination relative to market coordination in the 
political economy. 
Table 2 reports the factor scores on the relevant principal component for each nation, 
standardized to vary between 0 and 1, with higher values indicating that strategic co-
ordination is more important in the political economy relative to market coordina-
tion. The scores for all the nations that the varieties of capitalism literature classifies as 
LMEs or CMEs fall into the portions of the spectrum that this literature would lead us 
to expect. The US, UK, Canada, Ireland and Australia all have scores well below .50. 
Austria, Germany, Norway, Japan, Belgium, Finland, Denmark, Sweden and Switzer-
land all have scores above .50, although Switzerland’s score is lower than expected. 
These results are broadly supportive of this third hypothesis. 
Table 2 includes the two other indices in the literature most likely to tap this dimen-
sion, although Soskice (1990) focuses on wage coordination and both are based on 
more subjective assessments of the cases (cf. Hicks/Kenworthy 1998). All three indi-
ces confirm the plausibility of the distinction between LMEs and CMEs, although 
there are some differences in the ranking of countries inside each of these groups and 
of some countries not assigned to them. For this reason, we would be cautious about 
attributing too much significance to the precise score a nation receives on these scales 
relative to the nations around it. It is clear that Austria is a highly-coordinated econ-
omy but whether Germany, Sweden or Norway is the next most-coordinated is less 
certain. However, these findings tend to confirm the basic distinction the varieties of 
capitalism literature draws between market-oriented and strategic coordination and 
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its contention that economies vary systematically according to the relative balance 
between strategic and market coordination in the political economy. 
As a further test, we have developed indicators for the character of coordination in 
two of the most crucial spheres of the political economy, those of labor relations and 
corporate governance, largely responsible for the allocation of labor and capital re-
spectively. To construct the indicator for corporate governance, we performed a factor 
analysis using the principal factors method on three variables that correspond to the 
institutional features this approach emphasizes when distinguishing among systems of 
corporate governance: shareholder power, dispersion of control, and size of the stock 
market. An analogous indicator was developed for labor relations using a factor analy-
sis on variables representing the level of wage coordination, the degree of wage coor-
dination, and labor turnover. In both cases, the analysis identified only one factor 
with an eigenvalue over 1 that we take to represent the relative balance between mar-
ket and strategic coordination in that sphere of the political economy. From the factor 
loadings, we created factor scores for all the OECD nations for which the relevant data 
Table 2 The coordination index and analogous indicators compared 
 Coordination index Soskice index Hicks-Kenworthy 
corporatism score 
Australia .36 . .17 
Austria 1 5 .96 
Belgium .74 . .67 
Canada .13 . .04 
Denmark .70 . .72 
Finland .72 . .88 
France .69 1.5 .40 
Germany .95 3.5 .80 
Ireland .29 . .07 
Italy  .87 2 .44 
Japan .74 5 .77 
Netherlands .66 3 .58 
New Zealand .21 . .14 
Norway .76 4 .96 
Portugal  .72 . . 
Spain .57 . . 
Sweden .69 4 .97 
Switzerland .51 4 .55 
United Kingdom .07 0 .10 
United States 0 0 .02 
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was available.13 On both indices, higher scores indicate higher levels of strategic coor-
dination relative to market coordination. 
We are now in a position to assess the following hypothesis derived from varieties of 
capitalism theory: 
H4: There is systematic variation among the developed economies such that those identi-
fied by the theory as LMEs display higher levels of market coordination in the spheres of 
labor relations and corporate governance and those identified as CMEs display higher 
levels of strategic coordination in both those spheres. 
If this is correct, when arrayed in a two-dimensional space reflecting the character of 
coordination, nations should not be distributed randomly across that space but at 
least two clusters should be identifiable toward its two poles and the nations present 
in those clusters should correspond to those the theory identifies as LMEs and CMEs. 
Figure 1 provides the relevant evidence, arraying nations on a two-dimensional plot 
with standardized scores for coordination in corporate governance on the X-axis and 
standardized scores for coordination in labor relations on the Y-axis. 
The results are broadly supportive of the hypothesis. As the regression line indicates, 
there is a strong and statistically significant relationship in the predicted direction 
between coordination in labor relations and corporate governance. Nations cluster 
toward the southwest and northeast quadrants of the diagram, as the theory would 
lead us to expect. Six nations, all normally identified by varieties of capitalism theory 
as liberal market economies, cluster to the southwest, on or below the regression line. 
The economies of northern Europe generally identified as CMEs cluster toward the 
northeast in this two-dimensional space. 
Japan and Switzerland are the two most obvious outliers. We are inclined to view their 
position as the result of measurement error associated with the limitations of our 
measure for coordination in corporate governance. The latter attaches considerable 
weight to the size of the stock market and both nations have large stock markets rela-
tive to their GDP. But there is also extensive cross-shareholding in these nations not 
picked up by our measure of shareholder dispersion because many of the relevant 
holdings fall below our 10 percent cut-off (Windolf 2002; Roe 2000). Nevertheless, 
                                                        
13 For detailed description of the variables, see Section 2 above. The factor loadings were as fol-
lows. For coordination in corporate governance: shareholder power .629 (uniqueness .604), 
dispersion of control .820 (uniqueness .327), size of stock market .718 (uniqueness .484). For 
coordination in labor relations: level of wage coordination .728 (uniqueness .450), degree of 
wage coordination .850 (uniqueness .277); labor turnover −.551 (uniqueness .696). The stan-
dardized scores for each nation on these factors are reported in Table 2. 
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these cross-shareholdings limit hostile takeovers and serve as vehicles for network 
monitoring. In short, we think an accurate assignment of these cases would put them 
into the northeast quadrant of the diagram. The coordination of labor relations in the 
Netherlands and Belgium may also be underestimated here, reflecting OECD figures 
that may underestimate coordination in labor relations. Given the potential for such 
measurement error in indices taken entirely from external sources, however, the cor-
respondence between the location of economies in Figure 1 and the account the varie-
ties of capitalism literatures gives of such economies is striking. 
The proximity of various nations to one another in this institutional space is also in-
teresting and facilitates more fine-grained assessment of variations among the OECD 
economies. Correcting for measurement error, there are four distinct clusters of na-
tions. Among the liberal market economies, the United States and the United King-
dom appear as relatively ‘pure’ cases, while four other liberal market economies stand 
slightly apart by virtue of systems of corporate governance in which market coordina-
tion is not as fully developed. On the other side of Figure 1, the nations most often 
identified as coordinated market economies all lie near or above the regression line, 
indicating high levels of strategic coordination in both their labor and financial mar-
kets. 
Figure 1 Institutional complementarities between coordination in labor relations 
and corporate governance 
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Four nations, Spain, Portugal, France and Italy all lie to the east in the figure but be-
low the regression line. This is especially interesting because there has been some con-
troversy about whether these nations are coordinated market economies or examples 
of another distinctive type of capitalism often associated with high levels of state in-
tervention on the supply side of the economy (Hall/Soskice 2001a; Rhodes 1997). 
Figure 1 clarifies some of the issues that render these ambiguous cases. These nations 
all have institutional capacities for strategic coordination in labor relations and corpo-
rate governance that are higher than those of LMEs. However, their capacities for stra-
tegic coordination in labor relations tend to be lower than those in northern Europe, 
perhaps because their union movements are still divided along what used to be called 
‘confessional’ lines. Although strategic coordination is clearly more important in these 
nations than in liberal market economies, there may be systematic differences in the 
operation of southern, as compared to northern, European economies.14 
4 Congruence across spheres of the political economy 
Although we have focused on corporate governance and labor relations as the two 
most important spheres of the economy, the varieties of capitalism approach also ex-
pects systematic variation, between LMEs and CMEs, across other spheres of the po-
litical economy, including those associated with product-market competition, social 
protection, vocational training, and interfirm relations more generally. Much of the 
force of the varieties of capitalism approach as a theory of comparative capitalism 
rests on its claim to be able to specify systematic variations across nations that extend 
to many spheres of the political economy. We turn now to assessment of that claim. 
Varieties of capitalism analysts argue that, where labor relations are based on high lev-
els of job mobility and firm-level wage-setting, training systems that provide general 
skills through formal education will be more efficient than collaborative training 
schemes that confer industry-specific skills, because workers who must frequently 
shift jobs have strong incentives to acquire the general skills that qualify them for 
other positions. Conversely, where labor relations are based on strong unions and 
coordinated wage-bargaining, it will be more efficient for firms to operate collabora-
tive training schemes conferring high levels of industry-specific skills. High wages set 
at the industry level encourage workers to acquire industry-specific skills, and they 
make it more difficult for non-training firms to poach workers by offering wage pre-
                                                        
14 The varieties of capitalism literature acknowledges that such differences may exist. Those 
between the “industry-coordinated” economies of northern Europe and “group-coordinated” 
economies of Asia have been elaborated most fully (cf. Soskice 1999). 
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miums. The organizations that coordinate wages can also be used to coordinate train-
ing systems (Finegold/Soskice 1988; Culpepper 2001). 
For similar reasons, this approach expects a relationship between the character of cor-
porate governance and the character of interfirm relations. Where the institutions of 
corporate governance limit the demands on firms to maximize current profitability or 
shareholder value, firms are said to find it easier to enter into collaborative arrange-
ments with other firms, for the purposes of research, product development or tech-
nology transfer. Facing fewer pressures from financial markets, firms can make more 
credible commitments to the incomplete contracts and co-specific investments that 
such collaboration requires. Conversely, where fluid capital markets facilitate the 
movement of funds from one endeavor to another, it will be more efficient for firms to 
access technology by acquiring other enterprises or new personnel and to invest in 
assets that can be switched to other uses as market opportunities emerge, rather than to 
engage in long-term collaboration with other firms (Casper 1999; Hall/Soskice 2001a). 
Estevez et al. (2001) argue that social policies providing generous employment and 
unemployment protection will be complementary to production strategies based on the 
use of specific skills because they provide incentives to workers for acquiring those 
skills (cf. Mares 2000). Hall and Soskice (2001a; Soskice 1999) argue that high levels of 
product-market regulation may be complementary to systems of corporate governance 
that encourage network monitoring, to wage coordination, and to interfirm collabo-
ration in research and development because they limit the intensity of competition in 
product markets that might otherwise undermine cooperation in these other spheres. 
Therefore, they expect to see some correspondence, if sometimes a loose one, between 
institutional practices across these spheres. 
The varieties of capitalism perspective also identifies potential complementarities be-
tween institutional arrangements in the political economy and the strategy of firms. 
Where strong trade unions or regulatory regimes inhibit layoffs and facilitate the for-
mation of credible commitments among firms or between a firm and its employees, 
the theory suggests that firms will often find it efficient to develop corporate strategies 
that turn on close cooperation with their employees and other firms. Conversely, 
where fluid labor markets facilitate layoffs and dispersed financial markets frequently 
demand them, firms are said to find such cooperative arrangements less advanta-
geous. With such reasoning, the approach contends that firm strategy will vary sys-
tematically across nations with the kind of institutional support their political econo-
mies provide for different types of coordination (cf. Hall/Soskice 2001a; Lehrer 2001). 
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In short, the varieties of capitalism literature contends that systematic variation across 
nations is present not only in the spheres of labor relations and corporate governance 
but across many other spheres of the political economy.15 To assess this contention, 
we have sought indicators for the types of variation in institutional practices the the-
ory emphasizes. We have found indicators for relevant types of institutional variation 
across seven spheres. For labor relations and corporate governance, we use the same 
indicators employed in the preceding analysis. The others are as follows: 
Social Protection refers to the level of support provided to the unemployed and to limitations 
on the right of firms to lay off workers. We measure it by combining the indices of ‘unem-
ployment protection’ and ‘employment protection’ devised by Estevez et al. (2001) using 
weights for each generated by the principal component that appears when a factor analysis is 
applied to the two indices. Higher values indicate higher levels of social protection. 
Product Market Regulation refers to the limits placed on competition in product markets by 
the regulatory restrictions that national governments impose on businesses. The measure is 
based on an OECD survey of many types of regulatory practices combined into a composite 
measure through multi-level factor analysis by Nicoletti et al. (2000: 80). Higher values indi-
cate product market regulations more restrictive of competition. 
Training Systems are assessed with a view to establishing the extent of institutional support a 
nation provides for the development of vocational skills in young workers beyond what they 
secure in formal secondary or university education. In general, this entails apprenticeship 
schemes or training programs dependent on the collaborative involvement of firms. The 
measure is based on the principal component that emerges from a factor analysis on two vari-
ables: the number of pupils in vocational training as a proportion of those in general educa-
tion and the mean scores on a literacy test secured by a sample of workers between the ages of 
20 and 25 who left school before completing secondary education (United Nations 1999: xxx; 
OECD 1997b: 141). Higher values indicate higher levels of institutional support for this kind 
of vocational training. 
Interfirm Relations refer to the institutionalized practices that link firms to other firms pro-
ducing goods and services. Of particular relevance is the extent to which firms collaborate with 
others to secure access to new technology or markets relative to their reliance on competitive 
market relations for such purposes. Mergers and acquisitions are typical of the latter. Accord-
ingly, the measure is based on the annual number of mergers and acquisitions in a nation 
during 1990–1997 expressed as a ratio of its population (Pagano/Volpin 2000: Table 4). We 
reverse the direction of the measure so that higher values indicate more inter-firm collabora-
tion. 
                                                        
15 Note that we make no claims here about why this systematic variation occurs nor do we assess 
claims about its origins. It may be encouraged by the presence of complementarities among 
these spheres but it may also arise because institutions diffuse together or as the result of com-
plex political processes. Our concern here is simply to assess whether the variation the varie-
ties of capitalism approach posits across political economies is present there. 
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To assess the ancillary claim that systematic variation in the institutions of the politi-
cal economy will be associated with distinctive types of firm structures and strategies, 
we have also sought measures for the latter, as follows: 
Managerial Prerogative refers to the extent to which firms concentrate control over their 
operations in the hands of top management. On the premise that compensation will corre-
spond to the level of responsibility they are assigned for the firm’s operations, our measure is 
the average compensation of chief executive officers as a ratio of the compensation of average 
production workers in manufacturing in 1999 (Economic Policy Institute 2001: xx). Higher 
values indicate higher levels of managerial prerogative. 
Employment Tenure is a measure of the length of time employees typically stay with the same 
firm, assessed here by median employer tenure in 1995 (OECD 1997: 138). This can be read as 
a reflection of the extent to which firm strategies turn on the development of close relations 
with a stable workforce rather than on production regimes that can be operated by more tran-
sient and potentially less-skilled labor. 
Firm Strategy is a composite measure tapping many of the core practices of firms, including 
the use they make of multidivisional project teams, participatory work teams, alliances with 
other firms, close, voice-based relations with suppliers, long-term relations with investors, and 
cooperative labor-management relations built on employment guarantees. Each practice has 
been coded on a 3 point scale and combined via factor analysis by Hicks and Kenworthy 
(1998: 1649).
16
 Higher values indicate firm strategies that make more extensive use of these 
‘cooperative’ practices. 
Using these variables, we test the following hypothesis: 
H5: Institutionalized practices extending across the spheres of the political economy vary 
systematically such that the institutionalized practices associated with market coordina-
tion are present in multiple spheres of many political economies classified as LMEs and 
practices associated with strategic coordination are present in multiple spheres of political 
economies classified as CMEs. 
If this is correct, there should be significant correlations across spheres at the national 
level among the variables representing the institutional practices the varieties of capi-
talism perspective identifies as important to coordination. 
Figure 2 summarizes the results of this test. The boxes around ‘firm strategy’ represent 
the four spheres in which a firm coordinates with other actors to accomplish its prin-
cipal endeavors. The two variables at the top indicate policy regimes relevant to this 
coordination. The lines between the boxes correspond to the hypotheses about com-
                                                        
16 This measures uses the average 1960–89 scores for a factor that Hicks and Kenworthy label 
“firm-level cooperation” which includes some further variables assigned low weights that we 
do not enumerate here. 
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plementarities generated by the varieties of capitalism literature. Using cross-national 
comparisons of all the cases for which we have relevant measures, we have calculated 
correlation coefficients indicating whether the presence of institutional practices of a 
particular type in one sphere are associated with institutional practices in adjacent 
spheres that correspond to those posited by a varieties of capitalism perspective. That 
perspective predicts positive coefficients across the diagram. The results are impres-
sive. The coefficients in Figure 2 are uniformly positive and relatively large. All are 
statistically significant at the .05 level.17 The uniformity of the results is striking. 
Although these results do not speak to the issue of why such uniformities exist, they 
confirm that institutional differences corresponding to market-oriented or strategic-
coordination of the sort expected by the varieties of capitalism perspective exist 
among the developed economies and stretch systematically across spheres of the po-
litical economy.18 
The patterns of firm strategy present in Figure 2 are also notable. They suggest that 
corporate strategy varies systematically with the institutional support available for 
                                                        
17 The coefficient between corporate governance and firm strategy just misses significance at the 
.05 level. 
18 Although some analysts associate institutional congruence of these sorts with institutional 
complementarities, on the grounds that the search for greater efficiencies will motivate firms 
to seek and support congruent practices, precisely why such congruence exists remains an 
open question. It may well be conditioned by processes of institutional emulation in which 
analogous institutions in multiple spheres ‘diffuse’ together or by broader political processes 
that we do not address here. 
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different types of coordination in the political economy, as varieties of capitalism the-
ory predicts. Table 3 provides further evidence for this contention by comparing the 
relationship between three indicators for corporate strategy and national scores on the 
coordination index. In each case, there is a strong and statistically significant correla-
tion in the direction posited by the theory. 
5 The effect of institutional complementarities on economic growth 
Up to this point, our results indicate that the patterns in institutionalized practices 
that the varieties of capitalism perspective expects to see across the developed econo-
mies are present there. We turn now to one of the most important contentions in that 
perspective, namely the claim that there is not only some congruence among institu-
tional practices in different spheres of the economy but that, in some cases, these 
practices can be complementary to one another. Following this literature, we define 
complementarity as follows: one set of institutional practices can be said to be com-
plementary to another when each raises the returns available from the other. Al-
though these institutions may also have distributive effects that increase the returns to 
some actors relative to others, we are concerned here with returns to the economy as a 
whole of the sort normally reflected in aggregate economic performance. 
Our analysis focuses on the potential for complementarities between the sphere of 
corporate governance and the sphere of labor relations. Following Aoki (1994), Hall 
and Soskice (2001a) develop a theoretical rationale for why such complementarities 
should exist and in what sorts of institutional practices they consist, based on the im-
portance of coordination to the success of a firm’s endeavors. They argue that institu-
tional practices in the sphere of corporate governance that encourage cross-
shareholding and concentrate control in the hands of management, thereby limiting 
the potential for hostile takeovers and providing firms with access to finance that 
turns more heavily on reputational monitoring than current profitability, enhance the 
efficiency of institutional practices in the sphere of labor relations that provide high 
Table 3 The relationship between institutional support for strategic  
 coordination and corporate strategy 
 Correlation with coordination index 
Firm strategy .615 
(.007) 
Employment tenure .694 
(.001) 
Managerial prerogative 
−.794 
(.006) 
Note: Significance levels in parentheses. 
Hall/Gingerich: Varieties of Capitalism and Institutional Complementarities 23 
levels of employment security and long job tenures as well as forms of wage-setting 
that revolve around strategic interaction between employers associations and trade 
unions.19 The logic is that firms that do not have to sustain current profitability in the 
face of a fluctuating economy are better placed to make credible commitments to 
their employees about wages and job security and therefore better able to realize the 
gains available from utilizing production regimes based on such commitments. This 
combination of institutions corresponds to the institutional patterns the varieties of 
capitalism perspective sees in CMEs. 
Conversely, where firms are more dependent on dispersed equity markets, face the 
prospect of hostile takeovers, and confront regulations that give shareholders more 
power relative to stakeholders, the autonomy of the firm and its managers will be 
more dependent on current profitability. Here, labor markets allowing for high levels 
of labor turnover and competitive wage-setting will be more efficient, because they 
enable managers to reduce wages or staffing levels more quickly in response to fluc-
tuations in current profitability, and allow the kind of labor relations that permit 
firms to exploit the high levels of capital mobility available in such economies. This 
combination of institutional practices corresponds to the case of a classic LME. 
If the institutionalized practices characteristic of relatively pure liberal or coordinated 
market economies in these two spheres are complementary to each other, we should 
expect to see an impact on aggregate economic performance. Our indicator for per-
formance will be rates of economic growth per capita measured in purchasing-parity 
terms, widely accepted as a good measure of overall economic performance and ap-
propriate for testing postulates about the general efficiency of the economy. However, 
this measure provides an exceptionally hard test for institutional analyses such as 
these. Because aggregate rates of growth depend on the efficiency of the entire econ-
omy, specific institutions will have to make substantial contributions to it to increase 
aggregate rates of growth. 
We begin by exploring interaction effects between institutions in the spheres of corpo-
rate governance and labor relations. As summary measures for the character of insti-
tutions in these two spheres, we used the indices for ‘labor relations’ and ‘corporate 
governance’ developed in section 3. High values of these indices reflect institutions 
more closely approximating those associated with CMEs, of the sort that allow for 
more effective strategic coordination, and lower values reflect institutions associated 
with LMEs where market coordination is more feasible. We estimate the interaction 
effects between these two variables and their impact, with a range of appropriate con-
trols standard in the growth literature, on annual rates of per capita economic growth 
for OECD nations from 1971 to 1997, taking three different econometric approaches 
                                                        
19 When we say that one institutional practice enhances the efficiency of another, this means that 
its presence increases the returns available from using the other institutional practice. 
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to the panel data.20 Initially, we employed a model based on ordinary least squares 
regression with panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE; Beck/Katz 1995) of the fol-
lowing form: 
itititititi
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i
LR
i
CG
i
LR
iit DToTIntGDPCCCCY εββπβββββββ ++++++⋅+++= 876543210 ln  (1) 
where CLRi represents the character of coordination in labor relations in country i and 
CCGi represents the character of coordination in its sphere of corporate governance. 
This model is used to test the following hypothesis derived from the varieties of capi-
talism perspective on institutional complementarities: 
H6: When there are higher levels of market (strategic) coordination in the sphere of labor 
relations or corporate governance, rates of economic growth increase as the level of market 
(strategic) coordination in the other sphere increases. 
If this is correct, the interaction term in the model, CLRi* C
CG
i, should be statistically 
significant and positive. A significant coefficient indicates that the impact of coordina-
tion in one sphere is dependent on the character of coordination in the other sphere, 
and a positive coefficient indicates that analogous types of coordination in the two 
spheres raise rates of growth. 
The controls employed here are standard for estimating rates of economic growth: 
lnGDPi is the log of gross domestic product per capita for country i at the beginning 
of the period controlling for ‘catch up’ effects that generate higher rates of growth in 
nations at lower levels of economic development. Intit represents international de-
mand conditions measured by the average rate of growth for our sample countries in 
period t weighted by the trade openness of country i. πit is the country’s rate of infla-
tion measured by the rate of increase in its consumer price index. In the developed 
world, where rates of inflation are moderate, we expect them to be positively related 
to rates of growth. ToTit is the percentage change in the terms of trade of country i 
weighted by trade openness: adverse movements should lower rates of economic 
growth. Dit is the dependency ratio measured as the share of the population below the 
age of 15 or above the age of 65. A higher proportion of dependents is expected to 
lower rates of economic growth. 
                                                        
20 The nations included were those for which data was available to construct the indices for 
coordination in labor relations and corporate governance. See the Table 3 for the full list. Be-
cause we think there is substantial measurement error in the placement of Japan and Switzer-
land on the CG index, they were excluded from these estimations. When they are included, 
the sign on the interaction variable remains positive but it is statistically significant only in the 
estimation using OLS with panel-corrected standard errors. 
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However, the coefficients generated by this estimation procedure may be biased by 
country-specific fixed effects. The application of a LaGrange multiplier test devised by 
Bruesch and Pagan (1980) indicates the presence of such effects, and using a standard 
fixed-effects regression would not allow us to estimate coefficients for the time-
invariant independent variables.21 Accordingly, we also use a random-effects estima-
tor with time-invariant independent variables as presented in Ruud (2000; cf. Hsiao 
1986). It is based on a matrix-weighted average of a fixed-effects estimator, generated 
by performing OLS on dependent and independent variables that have been multi-
plied by an idempotent matrix to transform them into differences from their means, 
and a between-estimator generated by performing OLS on dependent and independ-
ent variables that have been transformed into ones reflecting the difference between 
panel means and the variable mean. The random effects estimator converges to the 
OLS estimator as the efficient estimate of the between-group variance component 
goes to zero, and to the fixed-effects estimator as the between-group variance goes 
toward infinity (Hsiao 1986: 34–38). The model treats panel-specific effects as ran-
dom disturbances, as they would be if the panels in the study represent a random 
sample from a larger population, and it takes the following form: 
itiitit vZXY ++= '' γβ  (2) 
where Xit is a Kx1 vector of time- and panel-varying independent variables, Zi is a Jx1 
vector of panel-varying but time-invariant independent variables, and vit is an error 
term where ui are scalar constants representing panel-specific fixed effects and the 
error term is vit = ui + wit such that: E(ui) = E(wit) = 0, E(ui wit) = 0; E(ui uj) = σu
2, if i 
= j and otherwise 0; E(wit wjs) = σw
2, if i = j and t = s and otherwise 0; and E(ui Xit') = 
E(ui Zi') = E(wit Xit') = E(wit Zi') = 0. 
If the panel-specific effects and independent variables are still correlated even after the 
latter have been transformed, the random-effects model will be biased, and Hausman 
(1978) has produced a test for such correlation, based on the difference between the 
coefficients and covariance matrices of the fixed-effects and random-effects estima-
tors. Since this test indicates potential bias in our random-effects model, we also de-
velop a third set of estimates, employing an instrumental variables technique sug-
gested by Hausman and Taylor (1981). It produces a standard fixed-effects estimator 
for all variables that vary over time and space. To produce coefficient estimates on the 
time-invariant variables, the technique utilizes the time-variant variables assumed to 
                                                        
21 The test measures the difference between the ratio of the squared sum of residuals over time, 
summed over all panels, to the sum of the squared errors from equation 1. 
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be uncorrelated with panel-specific effects as instruments in a two-stage least-squares 
procedure.22 
Table 4 reports the results of these estimations. The parameter estimates are broadly 
stable across the three models. The coefficient on the interaction term is positive, of 
considerable magnitude, and statistically significant. These results tend to confirm the 
presence of substantial complementarities between the spheres of labor relations and 
corporate governance of the sort postulated by varieties of capitalism theory. 
Using the fixed-effects model for the purposes of simulation, Table 5 reports the rates 
of growth that could be expected under different combinations of coordination in 
labor relations and corporate governance when the control variables are at their 
means. Although one should be cautious about attributing significance to point esti-
mates in such simulations, the broad patterns in the table are revealing. They show 
clear evidence of interaction effects between the character of coordination in the two 
spheres. Rates of growth are highest where competitive markets coordinate both 
spheres or where institutional support for strategic coordination is high in both. 
                                                        
22 This fixed-effects estimator is consistent, if less efficient than the alternative 2SLS random 
effects estimator suggested by Hausman and Taylor would be, but a random-effects estimator 
constructed in this way failed the Hausman specification test. 
Table 4 The impact on economic growth of interaction between coordination in 
 labor relations and corporate governance  
 Random effects H-T IV fixed effects  PCSE 
International demand 
conditions (it) 
.416*** 
(.038) 
.793*** 
(.057) 
.574*** 
(.056) 
Inflation (it) .212*** 
(.023) 
.130*** 
(.028) 
.133*** 
(.034) 
Terms of trade (it) 
−1.02 
(2.66) 
.347 
(2.69) 
−1.76 
(2.41) 
Dependency ratio (it) 
−.573*** 
(.122) 
−.468*** 
(.132) 
−.403** 
(.168) 
ln GDP0 (i) −.453 
(.424) 
.477*** 
(.167) 
−2.47*** 
(.914) 
Coordination in labor 
relations (i) 
−4.20*** 
(1.58) 
−4.89*** 
(1.83) 
−7.80*** 
(2.72) 
Coordination in corporate 
governance (i) 
−1.67*** 
(.640) 
−1.10 
(.743) 
−2.55** 
(1.22) 
Labor relations*  
corporate governance (i) 
5.81*** 
(1.64) 
6.06*** 
(1.91) 
8.75*** 
(2.76) 
λLM 9.17  _ _ 
Hausman test 79.7 n.a. n.a. 
N 486 486 486 
Note: *** indicates the coefficient is significant at the 99% level, ** at the 95% level, and * at the 90% 
level. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Where labor relations are strategically coordinated, substantial efficiencies seem to be 
available from strategic coordination in the sphere of corporate governance. Where 
corporate governance is dominated by fluid equity markets, however, rates of growth 
are substantially higher when labor markets are also fluid and competitive. 
Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to test for the presence of specific com-
plementarities across the many other spheres where varieties of capitalism theory pre-
dicts they may lie, we conduct one other test at an aggregate level to assess the plausi-
bility of these contentions about complementarities in the macroeconomy. Given the 
emphasis it places on such complementarities, the varieties of capitalism approach 
strongly implies that aggregate economic performance should be better in nations 
whose institutionalized practices correspond more closely to relatively pure types of 
LMEs or CMEs, i.e., in nations where market or strategic coordination is highly de-
veloped in multiple spheres of the political economy. Over the long term, rates of 
growth should be higher in countries where market or strategic coordination is high 
across spheres, compared to those where coordination is mixed or where either type 
of coordination is secured but in a less fully developed form. This implication yields 
the following hypothesis: 
H7: Rates of economic growth should be higher in nations where levels of market coordi-
nation or levels of strategic coordination are high across spheres of the political economy 
but lower in nations where neither type of coordination is well-developed or market and 
strategic coordination are combined. 
If this is correct, estimates for rates of growth when other relevant factors are con-
trolled should show higher rates of growth in nations where levels of market or strate-
gic coordination are consistently high across spheres and lower rates in other nations. 
Table 5 Estimated rates of economic growth at different levels of coordination in 
 labor relations and corporate governance 
 Corporate governance 
 0 .25 .5 .75 1 
0 8.2 
(5.5, 10.8) 
7.9 
(5.2, 10.5) 
7.7 
(4.8, 10.4) 
7.4 
(4.5,10.3) 
7.1 
(4.1, 10.2) 
.25 7.0 
(4.2, 9.8) 
7.1 
(4.3, 9.9) 
7.2 
(4.5, 10.0) 
7.3 
(4.7, 10.1) 
7.4 
(4.5, 10.4) 
.5 5.7 
(2.5, 8.9) 
6.2 
(3.3, 9.2) 
6.7 
(3.9, 9.5) 
7.2 
(4.4, 10.0) 
7.7 
(4.8, 10.5) 
.75 4.9 
(.76, 8.3) 
5.4 
(2.1, 8.7) 
6.3 
(3.3, 9.2) 
7.1 
(4.3, 9.9) 
8.0 
(5.2, 10.8) 
Labor  
relations 
1 3.3 
(−1.2, 7.8) 
4.5 
(.80, 8.3) 
5.8 
(2.6, 9.0) 
7.0 
(4.1, 9.8) 
8.2 
(5.4, 11.1) 
Note: 95% confidence intervals in parentheses. 
28 MPIfG Discussion Paper 04 /5 
In order to test this hypothesis, we use the coordination index developed in Section 2 
to measure levels of market and strategic coordination across these two spheres of the 
political economy. We estimate the effect of coordination on annual rates of per cap-
ita economic growth for OECD nations from 1971 to 1997 using a model of the fol-
lowing form: 
itititititiiiit DToTIntGDPCCY εββπββββββ ++++++++= 765432210 ln  (3) 
where Ci is the value of the coordination index measuring the balance of market and 
strategic coordination in the political economy for country i. If the relationship between 
growth and coordination is U-shaped, b1 should be negative and b2 positive. The con-
trols are the standard ones used previously and, once again, we estimated the model 
using three specifications to cope with the potential for bias arising from collinearity 
between the time-invariant measure of coordination and panel-specific effects. 
Table 6 The relationship between coordination and economic growth 
 Random effectsa H-T IV fixed effectsb  PCSE 
International demand  
conditions (it) 
.467*** 
(.037) 
.822*** 
(.055) 
.576*** 
(.049) 
Inflation (it) .177*** 
(.024) 
.132*** 
(.026) 
.115*** 
(.035) 
Terms of trade (it) 
−3.22 
(2.40) 
−.776 
(2.42) 
−.676 
(2.51) 
Dependency ratio (it) 
−.413*** 
(.113) 
−.368*** 
(.121) 
−.335** 
(.157) 
ln GDP0 (i) −1.82*** 
(.540) 
.490** 
(.210) 
−2.20*** 
(.792) 
Coordination (overall) (i) 
−5.72*** 
(1.52) 
−3.63*** 
(1.47) 
−6.74*** 
(2.21) 
Coordination squared (i) 5.40*** 
(1.45) 
4.19*** 
(1.45) 
6.17*** 
(2.09) 
λLM 36.4 _  _ 
Hausman test 103.0 n.a. n.a. 
N 540 540 540 
a Specification is random effects with panel-specific (time-invariant) independent variables.  
b Specification is Hausman and Taylor’s (1981) instrumental variables fixed effects estimator. Standard
 errors in parentheses. 
Table 6 reports the results of these three estimations. In all, the coefficients on coordi-
nation are significant, of the same sign, and of similar magnitude, increasing our con-
fidence in the results. The significance and signs of the coefficients on C and C2 indi-
cate that the relationship between coordination and economic growth is nonlinear. 
Using the fixed-effects model for the simulation, Figure 3 shows the estimated rela-
tionship between coordination and growth when the control variables are at their 
means. The U-shaped relationship is apparent. Where the institutional structure of 
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the political economy allows for higher levels of market coordination or higher levels 
of strategic coordination, estimated growth rates are higher than they are when there 
is more variation in the types of coordination present in the political economy. 
These results suggest that the varieties of capitalism approach to institutional com-
plementarities, built on the distinction between market and strategic coordination, 
has real merit. When complementary institutions are present across spheres of the 
political economy, rates of economic growth are higher. The institutional comple-
mentarities identified by this perspective appear to offer general efficiencies. 
6 Political and economic adjustment paths 
We conclude by turning to issues of institutional change. As any such analysis must 
be, the varieties of capitalism theory of institutional complementarities is based on 
observation of the developed political economies over an extended period of time. 
Although its grounding in historical experience lends credibility to the account, inter-
national pressures for change now raise questions about the stability of the cross-
Figure 3 The estimated relationship between coordination and economic growth 
Predicted growth rate 
Coordination index 
0 .5 1 
7 
7.5 
8 
8.4 
Market coordination Strategic coordination  
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national differences this analysis identifies (cf. Berger/Dore 1996; Milner/Keohane 
1996). One central issue is whether the broad patterns of coordination that have dif-
ferentiated political economies will persist in the face of such pressures. 
The varieties of capitalism literature is attentive to such questions. Many contributors 
to it explore reform initiatives, shifts in the operation of institutions, and the response 
of firms and governments to pressures for change (Wood 2001, 2000; Culpepper 
forthcoming, 2001; Thelen 2001; Hancke 2001; Lehrer 2001). Moreover, there is an 
explicitly dynamic element to the overarching theory, designed to explain how exist-
ing institutions structure processes of change. This aspect of the theory generates a set 
of predictions about national adjustment paths that we now examine empirically with 
a view to establishing the continuing relevance of the distinctions drawn in this paper. 
Economic Dynamics 
Analyses of change in the political economy should be attentive to both economic and 
political dynamics. The principal economic issue in this case is whether institutions 
that appear to have been complementary in previous decades continue to be comple-
mentary as secular developments, such as the shift from manufacturing to services, 
technological change, and international liberalization, alter the character of economic 
challenges (Hall 1999, 1997). There are reasons for thinking such developments could 
alter the efficiencies available from existing combinations of institutions. If the poten-
tial for productivity growth is lower in services, the growing importance of that sector 
may undercut the efficiency gains available from systems of coordinated wage bar-
gaining or social protection that compress wage differentials and sustain high wage 
floors (Iversen/Wren 1998; Scharpf /Schmidt 2000). In epochs of rapid technological 
advance that increase the opportunities for radical innovation, the market-oriented 
complementarities of liberal market economies, which lend themselves to this type of 
innovation, may offer higher returns than they otherwise would relative to those of 
coordinated market economies, which are better at incremental innovation (Hall/
Soskice 2001a; Hall 1997; Soskice 1994).23 International integration may alter the 
value of an economy’s comparative institutional advantages by improving access to 
production sites offering other kinds of complementarities (cf. Frieden/Rogowski 
1996). 
If developments such as these alter the returns available from existing institutions, 
pressures to change those institutions are likely to increase. It is beyond the scope of 
this paper to consider the effects of each secular economic development on institu-
tional stability. However, a summary impression can be formed by comparing the 
economic impact of these institutional complementarities in recent years with their 
                                                        
23 On this point, our thinking has been influenced by conversations with Robert Fannion and 
Gavyn Davies. 
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impact in an earlier period. For this purpose, we estimated the models for the eco-
nomic impact of complementarities between coordination in labor relations and cor-
porate governance over two time periods, 1971–1984 and 1985–1997 (see equation 1). 
Once again, three estimation techniques were employed to accommodate the poten-
tial for panel specific effects, although a λLM indicates that estimates based on panel-
corrected standard errors are relatively unbiased by such effects. These estimations are 
used to test the following hypothesis: 
H8: Secular economic developments over the past two decades have not altered the effi-
ciency of the institutional complementarities posited by the varieties of capitalism perspec-
tive between labor relations and corporate governance. 
If this is correct, the coefficient on the interaction term between coordination in labor 
relations and corporate governance, CLRi* C
CG
i, should be positive and statistically 
significant across both periods. 
The results of the estimation are presented in Table 7. For the 1971–1984 period, the 
coefficients on the interaction term are positive, statistically significant, and larger 
than those for the entire 1971–1997 period (see Table 4). In the 1985–1997 period, the 
coefficients on the interaction term diminish in size but they remain positive and just 
miss statistical significance at the .05 level, as does the coefficient on coordination in 
Table 7 The Impact on economic growth of interaction between coordination in  
 labor relations and corporate governance in 1971–1984 and 1985–1997 
 1971–1984 1985–1997 
  RE  H-T IV FE  PCSE  RE H-T IV FE  PCSE 
International demand 
conditions (it) 
.325*** 
(.044) 
.685*** 
(.067) 
.374*** 
(.058) 
.504*** 
(.078) 
.971***
(.120) 
.660*** 
(.091) 
π (it) .012 
(.035) 
−.085** 
(.042) 
.018 
(.042) 
.049 
(.054) 
−.004 
(.063) 
.032 
(.066) 
Terms of trade (it) 
−2.21 
(2.9) 
−.951 
(2.94) 
−1.08 
(2.88) 
9.10** 
(4.55) 
9.38** 
(4.65) 
−5.31 
(3.83) 
Dependency ratio (it) .496*** 
(.172) 
.456** 
(.200) 
.226 
(.204) 
−.644***
(.188) 
−.553**
(.238) 
−.422** 
(.211) 
ln GDP0 (i) −.756 
(.644) 
.988*** 
(.219) 
−1.30 
(1.07) 
−2.18***
(.654) 
.388** 
(.167) 
−3.32*** 
(.887) 
Coordination in labor 
relations (i) 
−8.75*** 
(2.39) 
−8.92***
(2.55) 
−7.38** 
(2.96) 
−4.15* 
(2.21) 
−4.08* 
(2.26) 
−5.53* 
(3.31) 
Coordination in corporate 
governance (i) 
−.993 
(.907) 
−.348 
(.982) 
−1.39 
(1.29) 
−1.26 
(.962) 
−.468 
(.968) 
−2.11 
(1.42) 
Labor relations*  
corporate governance (i) 
9.64*** 
(2.49) 
9.57*** 
(2.67) 
8.22*** 
(3.05) 
4.48* 
(2.35) 
4.16* 
(2.41) 
6.04* 
(3.11) 
λLM 1.23 _ _ .025  _  _ 
Hausman test 53.0 n.a. n.a. 30.4  n.a.  n.a. 
N 252   234   
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. 
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labor relations. These findings do not strongly confirm the hypothesis but neither do 
they show it should be rejected. Institutional complementarities of the sort posited by 
the varieties of capitalism perspective seem to have had a larger impact on levels of 
economic growth in earlier decades and a smaller impact in recent years but one that 
remains nonnegligible. 
Two broad lines of explanation could account for this trend. Secular developments 
may have reduced the returns available from these complementarities. Alternatively, 
the complementarities may still be operative but their impact on cross-national differ-
ences in growth overwhelmed by recent developments for which we do not control in 
these equations. The latter could include cross-national differences in economic pol-
icy, confidence effects arising from asset booms, or technology races that privilege first 
movers. We cannot currently discriminate between these explanations. However, 
these results lend some credence to the view that secular economic changes may be 
diminishing the effectiveness of existing institutions, which should increase pressures 
for institutional change. 
Political Dynamics 
In this context, the political dynamics of institutional change become especially im-
portant, and the varieties of capitalism literature advances a particular view of such 
dynamics, built on the view that the market-oriented settings of liberal market 
economies encourage firms, holders of capital, and workers to invest in switchable 
assets, whereas institutional support for strategic interaction in coordinated market 
economies encourages higher levels of investment in specific assets (Hall/Soskice 
2001a; Iversen/Soskice 2000). In LMEs, fluid markets that facilitate the transfer of 
resources among uses enhance the returns to switchable assets. In CMEs, better insti-
tutional support for the formation of credible commitments reduces the risks of in-
vesting in co-specific assets whose value depends on the cooperation of others and 
that cannot readily be switched to other uses if that cooperation is not forthcoming. 
This divergence in patterns of investment is significant because each generates a dif-
ferent politics. In the face of an exogenous shock threatening returns to existing activi-
ties, holders of mobile assets will be tempted to ‘exit’ those activities to seek higher 
returns elsewhere, while holders of specific assets have higher incentives to exercise 
‘voice’ in defense of existing activities (Hirschman 1964). The argument is analogous 
to the distinction often drawn between a Hecksher-Ohlin world, where factors are 
mobile and shifts in relative prices (of the sort associated with increasing economic 
openness) generate conflict between the holders of basic factors, such as capital and 
labor, and a Ricardo-Viner world, where factors of production are sector-specific and 
shifts in relative prices inspire intersectoral conflict that unites employers and workers 
in defense of sectoral interests (cf. Hiscox 2001; Frieden /Rogowski 1996; Alt et al. 
1996; Rogowski 1989). 
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From this perspective, the varieties of capitalism literature argues that the initial po-
litical response to contemporary economic challenges will vary across liberal and co-
ordinated market economies. In LMEs, the response will be highly market-oriented. 
When returns to existing activities are threatened, holders of mobile assets, such as 
workers with general skills or owners of capital on fluid equity markets, will tend to 
shift to new activities. In general, they will be interested in rendering markets even 
more fluid. Where nations respond to shocks by relying on markets to adjust prices 
and wages, however, substantial shifts in the distribution of income may occur of the 
sort reflected in increasing income inequality. Such distributive effects are likely to 
increase conflict between those with and without market-power, namely conflict of a 
“class” character, notably in arenas responsible for the regulation of income, such as 
the sphere of industrial relations. 
In coordinated market economies, by contrast, the varieties of capitalism perspective 
expects similar economic challenges to inspire a different political response, mediated 
by higher levels of asset specificity. When returns to existing activities are threatened, 
holders of specific assets, such as workers with industry-specific skills and owners of 
enterprises deeply invested in co-specific assets, will find it difficult to shift to new 
activities. As a result, they will be less inclined to favor deregulatory initiatives that 
increase market competition and more inclined to demand institutional support for 
existing activities. The result is likely to be a politics of regulatory defense that may 
well also be conflictual but will unite workers and employers more often in ‘cross-
class’ coalitions of sectoral defense (cf. Swenson 1995; Wood 2001; Thelen/Kume 
2000). 
These postulates about political dynamics are important because they suggest that the 
response to contemporary economic shocks is likely to produce quite different institu-
tional outcomes in liberal and coordinated market economies. Although all capitalist 
economies use markets to adjust and will render some more flexible in the face of 
economic shocks, this analysis anticipates more and more-rapid deregulation in lib-
eral market economies, where there should be more political support for it, than in 
coordinated market economies, where cross-class coalitions arise to support existing 
regulatory regimes. The perspective anticipates some conflict and change in all na-
tions, including some liberalization in CMEs, but it also expects divergent institu-
tional adjustment paths across different types of political economies. 
In order to assess whether this perspective accurately models the response to recent 
economic challenges, we examine a number of indicators. As the approach predicts, 
levels of income inequality are not only higher in liberal than coordinated market 
economies; they have also increased much more rapidly there in recent years (see Fig-
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ure 4).24 This is what would be expected if LMEs respond to economic challenges by 
relying more heavily on competitive markets to reset wages and prices. 
We find similarly divergent outcomes in the sphere of industrial relations. Between 
the 1970s and 1990s, trade unions were dramatically weakened in liberal market 
economies. The proportions of the labor force belonging to a union or covered by 
collective bargaining agreements fell by a third. By contrast, trade unions remained 
relatively robust in coordinated economies, where 76 percent of the workforce was 
covered by a collective bargaining agreement on average in the late 1990s, compared 
with 38 percent in liberal economies (see Table 8). In the crucial sphere of labor rela-
tions, the response to recent economic challenges has reinforced, rather than under-
mined, institutional differences between liberal and coordinated market economies. 
To what extent have such differences declined in other spheres over this period? To 
form an assessment, we assemble indicators for the character of institutional practices 
in six spheres relevant to the varieties of capitalism arguments. The observations are 
                                                        
24 For the empirical analysis in this section of the paper, we adopt the classification of political 
economies that Hall and Soskice (2001a) use, terming those that they do not classify defin-
tively as liberal or coordinated market economies, mixed market economies. Portugal, Spain, 
France and Italy are in the latter category. 
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drawn from the mid-1980s and the latest point in the 1990s for which data were avail-
able. They are reported in Table 8. We distinguish among liberal market economies, 
coordinated market economies, and a third group of nations possessing many of the 
institutional features associated with strategic coordination but termed here ‘mixed 
market economies’ because they are not definitively classified into the other two cate-
gories by the varieties of capitalism literature.25 
                                                        
25 As labeled here, mixed market economies include those that fall clearly below the regression 
line on the right hand side of Figure 1, i.e. Spain, Portugal, Italy and France. 
Table 8 Patterns of institutional adjustment in the developed political economies 
 CMEs LMEs MMEs 
 1980s 1990s % ∆ 1980s 1990s % ∆ 1980s 1990s % ∆ 
Industrial relations          
Trade union density 55 53 
−4 46 31 −33 33 28 −15 
Bargaining coverage 76 76 0 58 38 
−34 79 89 13 
Bargaining level 1.7 1.8 6 2.3 2.5 9 1.8 2 11 
Social protection          
Employment protection 2.3 2.3 0 1.0 1.0 0 3.5 3 
−14 
Benefit entitlements 29 36 24 24 23 
−4 15 31 107 
Social spending /GDP 23 28 22 15 19 27 17 24 41 
Labor market flexibility          
Part-time employment  18 22 22 16 20.2 26 8 11 38 
Avg. hours worked 1713 1633 
−5 1810 1831 1 1812 1728 −5 
Income inequality .24 .25 4 .28 .33 16 .31 .31 0 
Firm structure          
Average job tenure 9.7 10.1 4 7.3 7.4 1 11.0 10.6 
−4 
CEO compensation 343 506 48 414 801 93 332 570 72 
Corporate governance          
Stock mkt. capitalization 36 61 69 51 96 88 14 31 121 
Debt /equity ratio 2.4 2.0 
−17 .66 .91 38 2.7 2.1 −22 
Earnings and employment          
Real earnings 22 26 18 22 23 4 24.2 27.9 15 
Unit labor costs 100 115 15 100 118 18 100 166 66 
Total employment 68 69 1 64 67 5 55 56 2 
Sources: Ebbinghaus /Visser (2000); Traxler et al. (2000); OECD (1994: 65, 179; 1995: 42, 52; 1997a: 5, 7, 138;
1998: 18; 1999: 57, 241); MacFarlan /Oxley (1996: A1); Schludi et al. (1998: 2.3.1); LeMaitre et al. (1997: 141, 
A1); Luxembourg Income Data Studies (2001); Economic Policy Institute 2000; Financial Times 8 Sept (2000:
11). 
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In Table 8, the cells for the 1980s reveal substantial differences between CMEs and 
LMEs of the sort associated with different types of coordination. Of most interest 
here, however, are the changes that took place from the 1980s to the 1990s. Is there a 
narrowing in the differences between LMEs and CMEs of the sort that might reflect 
institutional convergence? In the realm of social protection, differences between the 
two types of economies remain pronounced. Most striking is the increase in benefit 
entitlements in CMEs compared to a slight decline in LMEs, suggesting that the latter 
sharpened market mechanisms, while the former tended to cushion citizens against 
the effects of market adjustment, moving more slowly to make changes to social pro-
tection even though we can expect some reductions in the coming years. In the labor 
market, increases in part-time employment indicate a movement toward greater flexi-
bility across all nations, but increasing cross-national divergence in levels of income 
inequality and average annual hours worked per person in employment suggest dif-
ferent adjustment strategies across economies, at least in this initial period of adjust-
ment. 
Especially interesting are indicators for the institutional practices associated with firm 
strategy and finance. Here, much has been made of recent changes in CMEs that seem 
to reflect convergence on the practices of LMEs. However, these figures tell a more 
nuanced story. In CMEs, the compensation of chief executive officers and the size of 
stock markets have increased, taking the figures for the 1990s to levels characteristic of 
LMEs during the 1980s – undoubtedly changes of significance. But the analogous in-
creases in LMEs have been substantially greater, leaving significant gaps between the 
two types of economies on indicators of institutional practices, apparent in the debt-
to-equity ratios of nonfinancial enterprises, despite modest convergence there. 
The figures for earnings and employment tell a classic story of the different adjust-
ment paths followed by CMEs and LMEs. Strategically-coordinated wage bargaining 
systems push real earnings up steadily in CMEs, while market-led adjustment induces 
some decline in LMEs. But effective forms of coordination in the workplace and high 
levels of investment keep the increase in unit labor costs in CMEs below that of LMEs. 
However, the price paid for labor-saving investment and high real wages is a smaller 
increase in employment in CMEs compared with LMEs. 
On balance, we read these figures as an indication that institutional practices did not 
converge dramatically across political economies during the 1980s and 1990s. CMEs 
made modest efforts to improve flexibility, liberalizing some markets, and the institu-
tions supporting strategic coordination there have undergone some changes. No 
doubt, there will be further reforms in the coming years. But the absence of wholesale 
convergence in the face of the substantial economic pressures experienced during the 
1980s and 1990s suggests that the distinctions drawn by the varieties of capitalism 
literature between different types of political economies are likely to be relevant for 
some time to come. 
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7 Conclusion 
We entered this project uncertain about whether we could find indicators for the rele-
vant variables and what the tests of the hypotheses would reveal. We leave it im-
pressed with the uniformity of the results. The weight of the evidence suggests that the 
varieties of capitalism literature has identified important differences among political 
economies. In the spheres of labor relations and corporate governance, there are sys-
tematic differences among nations that correspond well to the underlying dimension 
of market-oriented versus strategic coordination that lies at the heart of the varieties 
of capitalism approach. The contention that institutional complementarities operate 
across these two spheres of the political economy is also borne out by the evidence. 
The persistence of cross-national differences in institutional practices in the face of 
intense pressures for convergence suggests that, despite some liberalization, the dis-
tinctions central to the varieties of capitalism approach are likely to be of continuing 
importance. 
Our findings about complementarities have especially important implications for 
reform proposals now being considered in many nations. Proposals to deregulate la-
bor markets have become increasingly popular in the developed world. However, our 
evidence suggests that labor-market deregulation is likely to produce large economic 
gains only in nations where financial markets are similarly fluid (see Table 5). Other-
wise, the growth effects are relatively small. Similarly, many nations have come under 
increasing pressure from international agencies or global financial actors to expand 
equity markets and enhance competition in markets for corporate governance. How-
ever, these estimates suggest that, in the developed economies, such steps may have 
only small positive effects on growth and ones that are available only where labor 
markets are also highly fluid. Where labor market institutions are not so market-
oriented, the effects on economic growth of deregulating corporate governance may 
be deleterious. 
The broader lesson here is that those seeking to understand the economic impact of 
institutions should pay careful attention to the potential for institutional complemen-
tarities across spheres of the political economy. Most proposals to reform labor or 
capital markets are based on econometric estimates about the effects of reform that 
consider historical data only for the sphere being reformed. If the distribution of insti-
tutions across national cases is random, cross-national studies of this sort can produce 
accurate results. But our evidence indicates that this distribution is far from random: 
nations with particular types of institutions in one sphere tend to have particular types 
of institutions in other spheres, as a varieties of capitalism analysis predicts. As a re-
sult, models that do not take interaction effects across institutional spheres into ac-
count may attribute to one set of institutions effects that are actually generated by 
interaction among several sets of institutions. 
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Accordingly, these results set a research agenda, but they do not leave it entirely open: 
ours is not a counsel of despair that finds complementarities everywhere. Although 
there are undoubtedly more complementarities in the political economy than we have 
examined, the varieties of capitalism literature specifies some precise complementari-
ties that can be explored in more detail. The range of institutional indicators available 
for doing so is expanding, and our results indicate that such analyses can be fruitful 
(cf. Amable et al. 2000; Ernst 2002; Nicoletti et al. 2000; La Porta et al. 1998a; Kenwor-
thy 1995). 
In the most general terms, this analysis lends empirical weight to the theoretical per-
spective advanced by the varieties of capitalism literature. It suggests that a varieties of 
capitalism approach to comparative capitalism need not be pertinent only to relatively 
pure types of LMEs or CMEs but that the types of institutional differences to which it 
draws our attention, based on the concepts of market-oriented and strategic coordina-
tion, are central to the operation of many developed political economies. This analyti-
cal framework can be used to locate many nations vis-à-vis one another and it yields 
important insights about their economic performance. 
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